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The enforcement of legislation through administrative procedures has two primary aims. One is to place the initial enforcement proceedings in the hands of a body of experts sympathetic
with the purposes of the statute and possessing the specialized
knowledge essential to an adequate handling of the complex problems with which much of our present day legislation deals. The
other is to achieve a more rapid and more efficient disposition of
the numerous controversies bound to arise out of almost any piece
of legislation dealing with our more serious problems. The administrative process has developed in response to the inevitable extension of government regulation designed to bring some order into the increasing complexities of modern economic society. I think
it cannot be doubted that some such procedure is vital if the
techniques of government are to keep pace with the development
of our economic, social and political life.
The National Labor Relations Act well illustrates the field
in which administrative procedures are essential to the successful
operation of legislation. The problems of labor relations are delicate and complex. Prosecuting and judicial agencies in existence
at the passage of the act were in general ill-equipped by training
or experience to deal with problems arising in this field. At the
same time the need for speed and dispatch is urgent. A labor
situation does not remain in statu quo for long. It is likely either
* Address delivered at the thirty-sLxth annual meeting of the Association of

American Law Schools, held in Chicago, Illinois, on December 30, 1938.
** Chairman, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D. C.
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to develop rapidly into an explosion or to subside quickly into
nothing. In short if the rights of workers to self-organization
and collective bargaining are to be preserved, it must be done
through machinery that is directed by experts and designed for
swift and efficient disposition of controversies. The fate of Section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act - the enforcement of which was attempted through non-administrative procedure - adequately points the lesson in this respect.
At the same time there is much concern expressed today over
the expansion of the administrative process in the field of governmental regulation. Without doubt a good deal of this concern is
based upon opposition to the regulation itself rather than the
method of its enforcement; and the propaganda of those with this
point of view is unquestionably responsible for even more of the
fears that have been expressed over the rapid development of the
administrative process. Nevertheless it must be admitted that the
establishment of general safeguards, to be administered by the
judiciary where necessary, is vital to the preservation of the democratic process. These safeguards must not be so restrictive, or applied with such disregard for the problems to be solved, that they
jeopardize legitimate methods or objectives of the administrative
process. The unintelligent or unsympathetic application of general procedural restrictions could readily cripple and destroy the
functioning of almost any administrative agency. On the other
hand the safeguards should be sufficient to guarantee against abuse
of the administrative process.
Fundamental to any such check upon the administrative process is the requirement of a "fair hearing." I agree with Professor Fuchs that the question whether general rules can be laid
down to guarantee a fair hearing must be approached first through
a consideration of the specific procedures of specific administrative
agencies. I will endeavor, therefore, to outline briefly the procedure of the National Labor Relations Board and then to consider
certain problems of fair hearing which have been raised by our
experience in administration thus far.
Under the National Labor Relations Act the National Labor
Relations Board has two general functions, the administration of
each nf which has a procedure somewhat different from the other.
First the act guarantees to employees the right of freedom in selforganization and the right of collective bargaining with their employer. Interference with the right of self-organization by em-
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ployers, and the refusal by an employer to bargain collectivelwith the representatives of his employees, are unfair labor practices. Where an employer has engaged or is engaging in unfair
labor practices the Board is empowered to prevent their recurrence
and to require affirmative action necessary to restore the status quo.
Secondly, the act sets up machinery by which the Board may determine who has been selected as the representative of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit and who, therefore, has
exclusive rights of collective bargaining with the employer.
The Board administers the act through a staff at Washington
and through twenty-two regional offices throughout the country.
Each regional office consists of a regional director, with his assistants, and a regional attorney, with subordinate attorneys. I will
consider first the Board's procedure with respect to its functions
of preventing and remedying unfair labor practices.
Upon the filing of a charge that a violation of the act has
occurred, the regional office sends an agent to investigate. If the
charge seems justified, the regional director or his agent attempts
to obtain an adjustment through voluntary compliance with the
act. As in the case of most other statutes, the great majority of
the cases are adjusted in this manner without resort to formal legal
proceedings. Throughout the period of its existence thus far, a
little over three years, the Board has handled a total of more than
18,000 cases. Of these, 14,000 cases, or over three-quarters, have
been closed, and of the cases closed more than 95 per cent were
closed by vohmtary adjustment. Thus only 5 per cent involved
the necessity of a hearing or other formal action under the act.
Where it is impossible to secure an adjustment and the facts
seem to point to a violation of the act the regional director issues
and serves upon the employer a complaint setting forth the facts
upon which the Board bases its jurisdiction and the alleged facts
relating to the unfair labor practices. Accompanying the complaint is a notice of a hearing before a trial examiner designated
by the Board. The trial examiner, it should be noted, is appointed
by the chief trial examiner who is responsible to the secretary of
the Board and who is not a part of the legal division.
At the hearing the Board's attorney presents the evidence in
support of the complaint. An attorney for the labor organization
involved is often present and may likewise participate. The respondent may of course appear through its attorney and offer evidence
in its defense. Under the act the rules of evidence prevailing in
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courts of law or equity are not controlling. Nevertheless the hearing in general is conducted in accordance with the usual rules of
evidence and departures therefrom are permitted by the trial
examiner only where adequate reason is shown.
At the conclusion of the hearing the trial examiner normally
issues a so-called intermediate report containing his findings as to
the facts and his recommendations as to relief. The intermediate
report is served on the parties to the proceeding, who are notified
that exceptions and requests for oral argument or briefs should be
filed with the Board within a stated period. If exceptions to the
intermediate report are filed or if the recommendations of the trial
examiner are not complied with, the case comes before the Board
for decision. In a few cases the Board transfers the case to itself
immediately after hearing without an intermediate report from the
trial examiner. In such instances the Board, prior to issuing a final
decision, issues proposed findings of fact, proposed conclusions of
law and a proposed order, to which the parties may file exceptions
and request oral argument or briefs in the same manner as in the
case of an intermediate report.
Oral argument is heard before the Board itself in Washington
whenever requested by any of tho parties or, occasionally, upon
request of the Board itself. Briefs are always accepted and considered upon the request of any of the parties or likewise occasionally upon request of the Board.
The case is now ready for decision by the Board. Despite the
relatively small number of cases which go to hearing, the absolute
number of cases which come before the Board for decision is large.
During the past three years the Board has issued some 1200 decisions. At the present time there are several hundred cases pending before the Board for decision. The average record in each case
is well over 1,000 pages. It can readily be seen from these figures
that the Board members themselves cannot expect to read the
records. In making its decisions the Board therefore avails itself
of assistants known as review attorneys who are under the direction
of an assistant general counsel and a group of supervisors. The
review attorneys analyze the evidence, inform the Board of the
contentions of all parties and the testimony relating thereto, and
make initial drafts of the Board's findings and order.
In every case the Board's decision contains findings of fact
and an order either dismissing the complaint or requiring the
respondent to cease and desist from its unfair labor practices and
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to take certain affirmative action to restore the status quo and
effectuate the purposes of the act. The order of the Board is not
self-enforceable. If the respondent does not comply with the
Board's order it is necessary for the Board to petition the appropriate circuit court of appeals for enforcement. The respondent
may likewise petition a circuit court for review of the Board's
order. On any review in the circuit court the Board's findings of
fact, if supported by evidence, are conclusive. The court has of
course full leeway to consider and decide questions of law. Among
the questions vf law properly before the court is the question
whether the Board's procedure has been proper and whether a
fair hearing has been accorded the respondent under the act and
under the due process clause of the Constitution.
The procedure for the certification of representatives follows
a somewhat similar pattern. Upon the filing of a petition for certification, the Board's agent investigates and, if it appears that a
question concerning representation has arisen, attempts to secure
adjustment through an informal check of union membership,
through a consent election, or through other similar informal proceedings. Where such adjustment is impossible the Board, upon
recommendation of its regional director, authorizes an investigation.
The regional director issues a notice of hearing which is served
upon the employer involved, upon the labor organization filing
the petition and upon any other labor organizations known to the
regional director to be claiming members among the employees
involved. A hearing is held before a trial examiner. In these cases
no complaint is issued and the role of the Board's attorney is one
of an investigator rather than prosecutor. In general if the labor
organizations involved are represented by counsel, the primary
burden of establishing the case is left to such counsel.
Upon the conclusion of the hearing the trial examiner does not
submit an intermediate report. He issues an informal report for
the guidance of the Board alone. The Board then, with the assistance of a review attorney, makes its decision. It may either
dismiss the petition, may certify representatives upon the basis of
the record, or may direct an election. In the latter event the
election is held under the supervision of the regional director.
The method of conducting elections cannot be considered in
detail at this time. In general it may be said that the election is
supervised directly by an agent of the Board but that representatives of interested labor organizations are entitled to participate
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and under normal circumstances an agent of the employer is likewise permitted to participate.
Following the ballot the regional director issues his intermediate report containing his conclusiong as to the results of the
election. Any of the parties, including the employer, has the
opportunity to file objections to this intermediate report. If no
objections are filed, the regional director submits the report to the
Board and the Board thereupon certifies representatives, or if no
representative has been chosen, dismisses the proceeding. If objections are filed to the report of the regional director but the objections do not raise any substantial or material issue the Board
proceeds in the same manner as if no objections were filed. If the
regional director considers that the objections do raise a substantial or material issue, he serves further notice on the parties to
appear before a trial examiner in support of their objections. In
such cases the trial examiner takes testimony but again does not
render any intermediate report. The record of the testimony is
transferred to the Board for decision and the Board, on the basis
of the record of the hearing and the regional director's intermediate
report, makes its decision either dismissing the petition or certifying representatives or taking such other action as seems necessary.
A certification of representatives has no enforceable effect. It
is merely evidence of a right to representation. The employer is
not bound by the decision nor is any order issued against the employer. Consequently there is no direct review in the courts of the
Board's certification of representatives. If, however, the employer
refuses to bargain collectively with the representatives certified by
the Board, and the Board thereupon brings an unfair labor practice proceeding against the employer based upon such refusal, the
employer may obtain a review in the courts, not only of the record
in the unfair labor practice proceeding but also 'of the record in
the prior certification proceeding.
It will be seen from the foregoing that the Board is not endowed with law-making functions. Under the act the Board's
powers are limited to the initial adjudication of controversies involving individual employers charged with violation of law, and to
the investigation and certification of facts relating to the representation of employees. The problems of fair hearing with which
the Board is concerned have therefore been confined to these two
types of administrative action.
During the three years of its existence the Board has had
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ample opportunity to consider certain major probl'ems of fair hearing. It need hardly be said that counsel for employers have not
been reticent in urging upon the Board and upon the courts alleged
deficiencies in the Board's procedure. Consequently it may be assumed that in the three years of operation thus far our attention
has been directed to most of the important questions of fair hearing
which are likely to affect employers appearing before the Board.
The same applies, perhaps to a somewhat lesser degree, to our procedure as it affects the rights of labor organizations.
First to be noted are various matters which relate to questions
of pleading. To what extent must the complaint recite in detail
the alleged unfair labor practices? Under what circumstances is
the respondent entitled to a bill of particulars? To what degree
can the Board's attorney amend the complaint during the course
of the hearing? If such an amendment is made what notice is the
respondent entitled to for the purpose of answering and preparing
its defense? To what extent is a variance between pleadings and
proof fatal to the validity of the Board's order? To what extent
may the Board adopt a differing theory of the case from that
alleged in the complaint or pursued by the Board's attorney at the
hearing.
Problems of this sort have been particularly acute during the
first few years of the Board's operations. The legislation is new.
That body of specific interpretation and application of the more
general provisions of the act - which grows up around every
statute - takes years to work out. As time goes on, and as the
scope and implications of the act become clear, there will undoubtedly be less difficulty with pleading questions of this sort.
However, even at the initial stages of the Board's operations,
it seems to me feasible to set up general rules of guidance which,
if intelligently and sympathetically applied by the courts, should
assure the respondent in each case adequate protection on issues
of pleading. A good illustration of such general principles is furnished by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in
National Labor Relations Board v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph
Company." The facts in the case were these:
After a period of unsuccessful negotiation between a labor
organization known as the American Radio Telegraphists Association and the Mackay Radio & Telegraph Company, the union
ordered a strike of its members for the purpose of enforcing its de1304 U. S. 333, 58 S. Ct. 904, 82 L. Ed. 1381 (1938).
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mands on the company. The strike was nation-wide but the facts
before the Board pertained only to the company's San Francisco
office. There the strike soon proved unsuccessful and after several
days the employees reported back for work. The company put
most of the strikers back to work but refused to take back certain
of the more active union leaders. The Board issued a complaint
alleging that the respondent had "discharged and refused to employ" the five men who were not reinstated for the reason that
they had joined and assisted a labor organization, and that by such
discharge the respondent had discriminated in regard to the hire
and tenure of employment of such employees contrary to Section
8(1) and (3) of the act. After completion of its testimony the
Board's attorney filed an amended complaint to conform with the
evidence in which it was alleged that the respondent had "refused
to reemploy" the five men in question for the reason that they had
joined and assisted a labor organization, and that such refusal of
reemployment constituted discrimination in regard to hire and
tenure of employment contrary to Section 8(1) and (3) of the
act. The respondent entered a general denial of the amended complaint and then presented its evidence. The Board found that
the respondent refused to reinstate to employment the five men,
"thereby discharging said employees," and by such acts discrimnated in regard to tenure of employment contrary to Section
8(1) and (3) of the act. In the circuit court of appeals and in the
Supreme Court the respondent contended that the original complaint had alleged a discrimination by discharging five men; that
after all the evidence was in, this complaint was withdrawn and a
new one presented alleging that the respondent had refused to reemploy the five men; that the Board in its findings had reverted to
the original position that the respondent had not failed to employ
but had discharged the employees; and that thus the respondent
was found guilty of an unfair labor practice which was not within the issues upon which the case was tried. The Supreme Court
rejected the respondent's contention and laid down the applicable
general principle in the following terms:
"A review of the record shows that at no time during
the hearings was there any misunderstanding as to what was
the basis of the Board's complaint. The entire evidence, pro
and con, was directed to the question whether, when the strike
failed and the men desired to come back and were told that
the strike would be forgotten and that they might come back
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in a body save for eleven men who were singled out for different treatment, six of whom, however, were treated like
everyone else, the respondent did in fact discriminate against
the remaining five because of union activity. 'While the
respondent was entitled to know the basis of the complaint
against it, and to explain its conduct, in an effort to meet that
complaint, we find from the record that it understood the issue
and was afforded full opportunity to justify the action of its
2
officers as innocent rather than discriminatory."
A somewhat similar question arose in ConsolidatedEdison Company v. National Labor Relations Board.3 In that case the Board
had ordered the respondent not to give effect to certain contracts
which the Board found had been entered into as part of the respondent's unfair labor practices. The respondent and the labor organization adversely affected contended that the validity of the
contracts was not in issue in the Board's proceeding and that the
Board's order on this point was therefore void. Although the members of the court disagreed upon the application of the rule there
was no disagreement that the governing principle in the case was
whether or not the issue of the validity of the contracts had been
"actually litigated."
In general it may be said that the foregoing problems of pleading with which the Board has been concerned are not materially
different from those which confront most other administrative
agencies having functions similar to those exercised by the National
Labor Relations Board. And, on the whole, it can be said that
general principles, such as those enunciated by the Supreme Court
in the Mackaj and Consolidated Edison decisions, are equally
applicable to the proceedings of such other administrative agencies
and can give full protection, on matters of pleading, to the rights
of parties appearing before them.
A second series of questions with which the Board has been
concerned relates to matters of evidence. As I have stated, the
National Labor Relations Act provides that in proceedings before
the Board "the rules of evidence prevailing in the courts of law or
equity shall not be controlling." This provision is similar to that
appearing in other laws creating administrative agencies to handle
the initial enforcement of legislation. From the point of view of
swift and efficient enforcement, in a proceeding where the issues
2 National Labor Relations Board v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.
S. 333, 350, 58 S. Ct. 904, 912, 82 L. Ed. 1381, 1392 (1938).
3 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 L. Ed. 131 (1938).
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are presented not to a jury but to a trained body of experts, there
can be no doubt of the wisdom of dispensing with the requirement
that the strict rules of evidence be followed. Nevertheless, such
freedom in the acceptance of testimony, especially when coupled
with the provision that the Board's findings of fact if supported by
evidence are conclusive, may well give rise to serious problems of
fair hearing.
To what extent can the Board ignore the hearsay rule? Should
the Board adhere to the best evidence rule? Is it proper for the
Board's trial examiners to permit leading questions on direct
examination? May counsel impeach his own witnesses? To what
extent and under what circumstances are employers entitled to
subpoena the records of a labor organization? To what extent may
the trial examiner cut short examination or participate in examination himself? These are some of the questions which frequently
arise. It is impossible to consider all of them in detail at this time,
but it may be worth while to discuss briefly what is probably the
most important of them, - the hearsay rule.
It will readily be acknowledged that most hearsay testimony
has little or no probative value. Nevertheless the Board has not
found it wise to exclude hearsay evidence altogether. For one thing,
many of the witnesses before the Board have not had the benefit
of formal education and are quite unaware of the significance of
various facts which may be relevant to the proceeding. Consequently it is often advisable for the trial examiner to allow considerable leeway with respect to hearsay upon the theory that it
may introduce or point the way to important leads hitherto unde.
veloped. Again, testimony which, though hearsay, is within the
power of the respondent to deny or explain, but which is left uncontradicted on the record, may under certain circumstances be
reasonably relied upon as having probative value. In general, as I
have said, the Board adheres to the hearsay rule unless good reason
appears for making an exception thereto. And in no case that I
recall has the Board relied solely upon hearsay to support an essential finding of fact.
What I have said is, I think, sufficient to show the advisability
of leaving the Board free to admit hearsay evidence, and to rely
upon it where reasonable to do. The question before us is whether
there can be laid down any general rule, applicable by way of
judicial review, which would check the Board in the event of extravagant use of hearsay evidence. Necessarily such a rule would
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have to be stated in broad terms, and its application would have
to vary with the circumstances. Yet the guiding principles which,
again if intelligently and sympathetically applied, should afford
adequate protection against real abuse can probably be stated.
In National Labor Relations Board v. Remington Rand, Inc.,4 the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has already attempted the statement of such a principle:
" . . . [The Trial Examiner] did indeed admit much that
would have been excluded at common law, but the act specifically so provides, section 10(b), 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(b);
no doubt, that does not mean that mere rumor' will serve to
'support' a finding, but hearsay may do so, at least if more
is not conveniently available, and if in the end the finding is
supported by the kind of evidence on which responsible persons are accustomed to rely in serious affairs."5
In the Consolidated Edison case the Supreme Court stated a
similar principle, coupling it with the rule that the Board's findings of fact must be supported not merely "by evidence" but by
"substantial" evidence:
"The companies contend that the Court of Appeals misconceived its power to review the findings and, instead of
searching the record to see if they were sustained by 'substantial' evidence, merely considered whether the record was
'wholly barren of evidence' to support them. We agree that
the statute, in providing that 'the findings of the Board as to
the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive', section 10(e), 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(e), means supported by substantial evidence. Washington, Virginia & 'Maryland Coach
Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 142, 147....
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. Appalachian Electric Power
Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985,
989; National Labor Relations Board v. Thompson Products,
6 Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15; Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760. We
do not think that the Circuit Court of Appeals intended to
apply a different test. In saying that the record was not
'wholly barren of evidence' to sustain the finding of discrimination, we think that the court referred to substantial
evidence. Ba~lston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v. National Labor
Relations Board, supra.
494 F. (2d) 862 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).

5 Id. at 873.

Italics supplied.
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"The companies urge that the Board received 'remote
hearsay' and 'mere rumor'. The statute provides that 'the
rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall
not be controlling'. The obvious purpose of this and similar
provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25, 44... ; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co.,
227 U. S. 88, 93... ; United States v. Abilene & Southern Ry.
Co., 265 U. S. 274, 288... ; Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United
States, 280 U. S. 420, 442... But this assurance of a desirable
flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as
to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational
probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does
not constitute substantial evidence."
In certain important respects the problems of evidence with
which the National Labor Relations Board deals are peculiar to the
field of labor relations and the application of the foregoing principles must be made with these peculiarities in mind. Thus, as I
have said, the absence of formal education on the part of most witnesses appearing in Board proceedings has an important bearing
upon the application of the hearsay rule and upon the advisability
of permitting leading questions. So, too, to mention but one more
example, the need of a labor organization to keep its membership
and activity concealed from a hostile employer is of extreme significance in determining the extent to which an employer may be
permitted to inspect union books and records. I think it may safely be said, however, that the foregoing rule, which necessarily must
be stated in general language, can serve equally well as the guiding
principle for other administrative agencies making determinations
of fact. Variances between agencies, such as have been pointed out
above, can be normally taken care of in the application of the rule
to the circumstances of the particular case.
A third problem of importance has been the question whether
a fair hearing requires the issuance of an intermediate report by
the trial examiner or, in lieu thereof, the issuance of proposed
findings of fact by the Board, with the opportunity to file exceptions
thereto and argue orally before the Board. After the decision of
'
the Supreme Court in the second Morgan case, it was contended
a Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206,
216, 83 L. Ed. 131, 140 (1938).
7 Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. 23, 58 S. Ct. 999, 82 L. Ed. 1135 (1938).
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that the Board's procedure was fatally defective in a few cases
where it had dispensed with the trial examiner's report and had
not issued proposed findings of fact. This contention was answered
by the Supreme Court in the Mackay case and again in the Consolidated Edion case. In the Mackay case the Court said:
"At the conclusion of the testimony, and prior to oral
argument before the examiner, the Board transferred the proceeding to Washington to be further heard before the Board.
It denied respondent's motion to resubmit the cause to the
trial examiner with directions to prepare and file an intermediate report. In the Circuit Court of Appeals the respondent assigned error to this ruling. It appears that oral argument was had and a brief was filed with the Board after which
it made its findings of fact and conclusions of law. The respondent now asserts that the failure of the Board to follow its
usual practice of the submission of a tentative report by the
trial examiner and a hearing on exceptions to that report deprived the respondent of opportunity to call to the Board's
attention the alleged fatal variance between the allegations
of the complaint and the Board's findings. What we have
said sufficiently indicates that the issues and contentions of
the parties were clearly defined and as no other detriment or
disadvantage is claimed to have ensued from the Board's procedure the matter is not one calling for a reversal of the order.
The Fifth Amendment guarantees no particular form of procedure; it protects substantial rights. Compare M1forgan v.
United States, 298 U. S. 468, 478 ... The contention that the
respondent was denied a full and adequate hearing must be
rejected.'"'
In the Consolidated Edison case, in response to a similar contention that the lack of an intermediate report or proposed findings constituted a denial of a fair hearing, the Supreme Court
stated:
"It cannot be said that the Board did not consider the
evidence or the petitioners' brief or failed to make its own
findings in the light of that evidence and argument. It would
have been better practice for the Board to have directed the
examiner to make a tentative report with an opportunity for
exceptions and argument thereon. But, aside from the question of the Brotherhood contracts, we find no basis for concluding that the issues and contentions were not clearly defined and that the petitioning companies were not fully ad-

s National Labor Relations Board v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.
S. 333, 350, 58 S. Ct. 904 913, 82 L. Ed. 1381, 1392 (1938).
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vised of them. National Labor Relations Board v. Mackay
Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U. S. 333, 350, 351... The points
raised as to the lack of procedural due process in this relation
cannot be sustained." 9
On this question of the intermediate report and proposed
findings the considerations applicable to the Board's procedure
would seem to apply generally to any administrative agency having
comparable procedure. In other words, in any administrative proceeding where a specific complaint is issued which defines the issues and apprises the respondent of them, it would seem clear that
a fair hearing does not require an intermediate report or proposed
findings. It is to be noted, however, that the Chief Justice in
the ConsolidatedEdison case expressed the opinion that the issuance
of an intermediate report by the trial examiner, or presumably the
issuance of proposed findings in lieu thereof, would be "better
practice," and, in fact, the, Board has, since the decision in the
second Morgan case, adopted the policy in unfair labor practice
cases of issuing proposed findings whenever the trial examiner, for
whatever reason, does not prepare an intermediate report.
It does not follow from the foregoing, however, that an intermediate report is "better practice" in every type of administrative
proceeding. Thus somewhat different considerations apply in proceedings before the Board for determination of representatives.
There the factor of speed is more important than in the normal
unfair labor practice case. It is vital, from the viewpoint both of
averting industrial strife and of assuring to employees the full
rights guaranteed by the act, that the determination of representatives proceed with dispatch. Furthermore, as stated above, the
Board's representation proceedings result merely in a certification
of fact and not in an order binding upon the employer or upon
anyone else. Consequently the Board, in the interest of promptness, dispenses with the intermediate report in a representation
case, both after the initial hearing and after the hearing upon objections to the ballot, if one is held. If the Board could be concerned only with giving the parties all possible procedural protection an intermediate report could be provided for in such situations.
But to do so would afford the parties only a slight additional procedural benefit while at the same time materially impairing important substantive rights guaranteed under the act. Under such cir9 Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206,
216, 83 L. Ed. 131, 140 (1938).
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cumstances it would not seem that the general principles of a fair
hearing would recommend the procedure of an intermediate report
or proposed findings.
Finally, there is another problem of fair hearing which has
been raised in connection with the Board's procedure but which
has thus far not been finally disposed of by the courts. Some of
the respondents in cases decided by the Board, relying principally
upon the second Morgan decision, have contended that they have
the right, as a matter of determining the fair hearing issue, to inquire into the Board's internal operations with a view to discovering whether the Board itself has considered the evidence and made
its own findings, or whether those functions were improperly delegated to subordinates. This question has normally been raised by
pleadings before the circuit court of appeals alleging on information and belief that the Board members themselves did not consider or appraise the evidence or did not make the findings of fact
which were issued as the Board's decision. Such pleading has
usually been supplemented by a motion to require the Board members and others to answer interrogatories, or a motion to take
depositions of the Board members and others, or both. *
The considerations which should be determinative of this issue
in so far as the National Labor Relations Board is concerned, seem
to me equally applicable to all administrative agencies which have
the function of adjudication, and in fact to the courts themselves.
And it can scarcely be doubted that the issue is a vital one in
judicial procedure. A somewhat similar inquiry into the functioning of the Secretary of Agriculture in the Margan case occupied
several days of trial. In the case of a court or board which makes
hundreds of adjudications during a year, if a litigant in each case
could, upon allegations based on information and belief, subject the
court or board to an inquisition as to its methods, its work would
be seriously impaired. Without going into the issues further it
seems clear to me that if the procedure of an administrative agency
makes provision for a complaint which defines the issues, for an
intermediate report or proposed findings which redefine the issues
after hearing, and for an oral argument, or opportunity for oral
argument before the agency itself, the requirements of fair hearing
do not permit an inquiry into the internal operations of the administrative agency, at least in the absence of specific allegations
of fraud.
In conclusion, I may perhaps be permitted to repeat what I
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have already stressed. With the expansion of administrative procedure into numerous fields of government operations, I conceive
it to be of vital importance to develop general principles, such as
rules implementing the requirement of fair hearing, which will
serve to prevent abuse of tbe administrative process. On the whole
I believe that satisfactory principles broadly applicable to the procedure of the various administrative agencies can be worked out.
However, these principles will of necessity be general in nature,
and their application to specific circumstances must depend upon
the factors governing the par2ticular situation. In the end they
will serve their purpose only if they are applied with a sympathetic
grasp of the functions of the administrative process and an intelligent understanding of the problems to be solved.
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